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ABSTRACT 
 The U.S. Army recognizes the ongoing threat posed by our adversaries’ strategic 
efforts to integrate information operations (IO), cyberspace operations, and emerging 
technologies that challenge U.S. freedom of maneuver across all domains. As a result, the 
U.S. Army is posturing for a doctrinal shift toward multi-domain operations, which will 
increase the role of information in warfighting. As it does, the U.S. Army faces 
challenges and disparities regarding IO in design and practice. Current U.S. Army IO 
doctrine, terminology, and overall structure is insufficient and does not facilitate a 
conceptual shared understanding. This leads to systemic underperformance of tactical 
units in the information environment and suboptimal integration of IO in strategy and 
plans. Similarly, the U.S. Army community of IO practitioners faces an identity crisis 
that degrades the profession’s cohesion, influence, and overall ability to operate 
effectively. To overcome these challenges, a critical examination of U.S. Army IO in 
design and practice is first required to reveal the scope of the disparity. Then, the 
application of social network analysis and social identity theories reveals potential 
solutions in IO training, education, and organization that will enable the U.S. Army to 
become more competitive in the information environment. This investment will enhance 
the Army’s ability to seamlessly integrate and execute information warfare in current and 
future conflicts. 
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A. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
The United States Army recognizes the ongoing threat posed by our adversaries’ 
ability to integrate information operations (IO), cyberspace operations, and emerging 
technologies into their strategic efforts to compete with the U.S. below the threshold of 
armed conflict as well as during competition and open warfare. The 2018 Department of 
Defense (DOD) Cyber Strategy warns that adversaries of the U.S., particularly China and 
Russia, are already integrating malicious cyber activity with cyber-enabled IO to 
undermine and threaten the U.S. and its interests, allies, and partners.1 Undeniably, 
adversaries of the U.S. will continue to challenge U.S. freedom of maneuver and action in 
all domains in the near future, to include both cyberspace and the information environment, 
as acknowledged by the U.S. Army’s doctrinal shift towards multi-domain operations 
(MDO). In the foreword of the Training and Doctrine Command pamphlet The U.S. Army 
in Multi-Domain Operations (MDO), 2028, General Milley illustrates his vision regarding 
how the U.S. Army must adapt to the new reality and develop multi-domain formations to 
“pose multiple and compounding dilemmas on the adversary.”2 This paradigm shift will 
require the Army to seamlessly integrate and execute cyberspace operations, deception, 
and information operations to achieve effects at all levels of war, from tactical to strategic. 
 However, these changes are not yet reflected in either U.S. Army IO doctrine nor 
the professional training and education of its Functional Area 30 (FA30 - IO Officer) force. 
Indeed, across the U.S. Army, there is a potential disparity between IO in design and how 
it is currently applied in ongoing operations, to say nothing about future operations. This 
manifests in IO often being marginalized, with IO officers and organizations performing 
functions outside of their specialty, often at the cost of integrating IO into operations. 
 
1 Department of Defense, Summary: Department of Defense Cyber Strategy 2018 (Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense, 2018), 1, https://media.defense.gov/2018/Sep/18/2002041658/-1/-
1/1/CYBER_STRATEGY_SUMMARY_FINAL.PDF. 
2 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028, 
Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-3-1 (Fort Eustis, VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine 
Command, 2018), iii. 
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Looking to the future, as Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER) seeks to become the Army’s 
first Information Warfare Command, the Army must reconcile the disparity between IO in 
design versus in practice and prepare for executing information operations in future conflict 
and MDO. Even though the Army recognizes the critical role that information operations 
can have in operations, there are obstacles and challenges that preclude the Army from 
effectively integrating IO. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How can the U.S. Army better train and educate FA30s and the Army to conduct 
successful information operations now and in future operations or conflict? 
C. METHODOLOGY 
We examine this research question using a three-part approach. First, we establish 
a baseline of the U.S. Army’s current organizational understanding of IO. Second, we 
compare that baseline with contemporary applications of IO in the Army to determine the 
extent of disparity there is, if any, between IO in design and in practice. Finally, using 
contemporary social network analysis and social identity theories, we describe the current 
identity and organizational issues with the U.S. Army community of IO practitioners that 
degrade the profession’s cohesion, influence, and overall ability to operate effectively. 
These findings inform the recommendations that, if implemented, will enhance the Army’s 
ability to integrate and execute information warfare in current and future conflicts.  
First, to fully understand the extent to which a disparity exists between IO design 
and practice, we establish a baseline of how IO is currently perceived by senior leaders, 
staffs, and soldiers throughout the U.S. Army, how these populations are educated about 
IO in their formal professional military education (PME), and how U.S. Army units 
currently conduct IO. During this phase of the research project, we conduct a wide variety 
of simultaneous research methods to gather quantitative and qualitative data to establish 
this baseline. The following focus areas are intended to establish an understanding of IO 
perceptions in the U.S. Army: 
1. How effectively does the U.S. Army plan and execute IO? 
3 
2. What are the biggest strengths of U.S. Army IO? 
3. What are the biggest challenges, shortfalls, and gaps regarding the way 
that the U.S. Army conducts IO? 
4. What formal IO-related educational practices exist in Army PME? 
5. How effective are the Functional Area 30 (FA30) IO planners? 
6. What IO related skills, traits, or competencies should IO officers have? 
7. How can the U.S. Army better task organize to conduct IO in multi-
domain warfare (MDO)?  
8. How can IO best support the U.S. Army in multi-domain operations 
(MDO)? 
Another method is to examine IO education at professional military education 
institutions. To accomplish this, we contacted Army intermediate and senior PME schools, 
including the CGSC to assess the current state of IO-related education available to mid/
senior-level leadership. Additional sources of data include the various Army Centers of 
Excellence, SAMS, IO-related graduate-level education programs at the Naval 
Postgraduate School and the National Defense University, and the Army IO Qualification 
Course at the USAIOP. 
In addition to those focus areas, the research team used publicly available data and/ 
or private data from the following institutions: 
1. Human Resources Command (HRC) non-PII data related to the 
Information Dominance branch, including duty titles, ranks, billet 
locations, prior MOS, and similar demographics. 
2. Combat training center (CTC) after-action-reviews (AARs). 
3. RAND Corporation studies. 
After we establish a baseline understanding of the current state of Army IO in 
practice, we compare the data with current and projected IO doctrine in order to assess the 
disparity, if any, between Army IO in doctrine and design. Key source documents with 
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which to compare our findings include both Joint Publication (JP) 3–13 and Field Manual 
(FM) 3–13, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3210.01, Department 
of the Army (DA) Pamphlet 600-3, and Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) 
Pamphlet 525-3-8. We focus on examining the following questions to determine the level 
of disparity: 
1. To what degree do U.S. Army command and staff leadership understand 
the role of IO in both current operations and future multi-domain 
operations (MDO)? 
2. Does current IO education in U.S. Army PME institutions sufficiently 
prepare Army leaders and staffs to plan and execute IO in accordance with 
JP 3-13 and FM 3-13? 
3. How and where are FA30s being employed across the force? 
4. Does current FA30 training and education sufficiently prepare FA30s to 
conduct their functional competencies as outlined in DA PAM 600-3? 
5. What are the challenges, shortfalls, and gaps associated with the U.S. 
Army’s current organization to conduct IO? 
6. What are the current challenges associated with adapting the U.S. Army’s 
IO framework to better support MDO in an evolving, increasingly 
cyberspace-focused information environment? 
By examining these questions, we identify the extent and severity of the disparity 
between IO in design, current practice, and future operations to inform potential solutions. 
We also identify obstacles and challenges to effective integration of information operations 
in the Army.  
Achieving effective integration of IO will require full unity of effort amongst the 
U.S. Army’s array of capabilities that create effects in the information environment. 
Presently, this is difficult to achieve because the multitude of these capabilities operate 
separately in their own stove-piped organizations, units, commands, and communities. 
Within this disjointed network of capabilities, Army IO Officers serve a vital role as 
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brokers and bridges to synchronize otherwise disparate capabilities towards a unifying 
goal. To understand the role that identity and social networks play in affecting Army IO, 
we apply social network analysis and social identity theory to the Army IO community. As 
part of this section, we identify how social networks, organizational symbols, narratives, 
and lineage can be leveraged to promote unity of effort within the Army and IO.  
Finally, based on our research findings and assessment of IO shortfalls in design 
and practice, we develop and present recommendations on how to reconcile any disparity 
between IO in design and current practice, as well as how to better prepare FA30s and the 
force to conduct IO in future operations. Ultimately, to adequately prepare our FA30 force 
for success in current operations as well as multi-domain operations, we must reconcile the 
disparity between what IO is and what it needs to be. 
The next chapter examines the literature around the research question, to include 
academic writing, doctrine, and government documents to establish a framework for the 
research. Chapter III seeks to describe how the Army designed the integration of IO into 
operations while Chapter IV outlines how IO is planned and executed in practice. Chapter 
IV also outlines a few challenges and obstacles for the information operations community 
and the Army. Chapter V describes the information operations network and personnel 
through social network analysis and social identity theory to depict both challenges and 
opportunities for the Army and IO. Through this research, we seek to identify any disparity 
between IO in design and practice as well as the challenges to its effective integration in 
the Army. With a global increase in the prevalence of information operations and 
associated activities in geo-politics and warfare, this research aims to depict how the Army 
can better integrate IO into Army operations to better poise for current and future conflict 
and competition.  
  
6 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The purpose of this literature review is to develop a common picture of Army 
Information Operations (IO) and is organized into two parts. First, we provide an overview 
of the current body of research and doctrine regarding Army IO in current design and 
practice. Second, we summarize the body of published work concerning the changing 
threat landscape in the information environment and the projected role of Army IO in future 
operations, specifically multi-domain operations (MDO). This literature review 
demonstrates that there is a noticeable absence of published work between those two sub-
sets, indicating a potential organizational gap of knowledge regarding how to transform 
current Army IO into what IO needs to be.  
A. ARMY IO IN CURRENT PRACTICE (WHERE WE ARE) 
In “Chapter III: Army IO in Design: A Critical Examination of IO Doctrine,” we 
conduct an in-depth, critical review of U.S. Army IO doctrine and its implications with 
regards to the successful implementation of IO. Therefore, in this literature review, we only 
briefly outline the scope and purpose of IO as described in doctrine to inform further 
discussion. As outlined in Field Manual 3-13, Information Operations, the U.S. Army 
currently uses the joint definition of IO as “the integrated employment, during military 
operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to 
influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential 
adversaries while protecting our own.”3 This definition designates IO as a military activity 
to be conducted exclusively during military operations, which is a self-imposed restriction 
that adversaries of the United States do not similarly observe. The definition also makes 
clear that U.S. military IO should focus on impacting the decision making of adversaries 
and potential adversaries. Missing from this definition is the broad spectrum of friendly 
and neutral activities in the information environment that the U.S. Army typically 
 
3 Department of the Army, Information Operations, FM 3-13 (Washington, DC: Department of the 
Army, 2016), 1-2, https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/FM%203-
13%20FINAL%20WEB.pdf. 
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categorizes as IO. In Chapter III, we discuss this discrepancy as well as other 
inconsistencies and issues concerning the doctrinal design and structure of U.S. Army IO. 
Perhaps due to the vague, widely misunderstood doctrinal definition of IO, it is no 
surprise that IO is a divisive topic within the U.S. Army. The body of literature involving 
differing interpretations of the purpose, scope, and utility of IO is broad and encompasses 
nearly every imaginable position on the subject. However, authors tend to agree nearly 
universally that the military’s current doctrinal IO concept is either misguided, insufficient, 
misinterpreted, or some combination of all three. For example, in his 2017 paper for The 
Strategy Bridge titled “Speed, Volume, and Ubiquity: Forget Information Operations & 
Focus on the Information Environment,” former Army IO Officer Michael Williams offers 
that the U.S. military doctrine has wrongfully emphasized specific IO capabilities which 
overshadows the concept itself. Instead, the author offers that “we should encourage those 
not familiar with information operations to see it as a vital component of planning in an 
information environment that is much more important to military planning and operations 
with each passing day,”4 while arguing that the current capability-focused paradigm does 
more to confuse and distract from the intended purpose of IO.  
Similarly, multiple authors and researchers recognize the growing importance of 
the information environment in current and future conflict and have thus identified that the 
U.S. Army’s current IO design is no longer sufficient. For example, even before the U.S. 
Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER) announced its intentions to transform into a more 
holistic information warfare command, author Conrad Crane explained the ubiquity of an 
information warfare command in his War on the Rocks article “The United States needs an 
Information Warfare Command: A Historical Examination.”5 Conrad, who was chief of 
historical services for the U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center of the U.S. Army War 
 
4 Michael Williams, “Speed, Volume, and Ubiquity: Forget Information Operations & Focus on the 
Information Environment,” The Strategy Bridge, July 26 2017. https://thestrategybridge.org/the-
bridge/2017/7/26/speed-volume-and-ubiquity-forget-information-operations-focus-on-the-information-
environment. 
5 Conrad Crane, “The United States Needs an Information Warfare Command: A Historical 
Examination,” War on the Rocks, June 14, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/06/the-united-states-
needs-an-information-warfare-command-a-historical-examination/. 
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College, argues that the establishment of such a command would “encourage decision-
makers to think of information warfare in the holistic sense that has long eluded the service 
and the nation.”6 The author contends that the action would finally move the U.S. towards 
a united understanding of IO that we certainly lack and our adversaries seem to have 
already attained.  
Indeed, IO is perhaps one of the most contested military topics amongst scholars 
and practitioners in modern military doctrine, partly due to the rapidly changing nature of 
the information environment. The current design and structure of Army IO facilitates a 
wide variety of interpretations while emerging technology and the onset of widespread 
cyberspace operations create diverging potential paths for the future of Army IO. 
Meanwhile, adversaries of the United States, particularly China, Russia, North Korea, and 
Iran, have seized upon the opportunities provided by an evolving cyberspace-enabled 
information environment, and are already exploiting it while the U.S. struggles with 
terminology and definitions. How the U.S. Army transforms to meet this new challenge 
will be crucial to its overall success in multi-domain operations. In the following section, 
we examine the current body of literature which predicts how this transformation could 
unfold.  
B. IO IN MDO (WHERE WE ARE GOING) 
In the foreword of the Training and Doctrine Command pamphlet on The U.S. Army 
in Multi-Domain Operations (MDO), 2028, General Milley illustrates that adversaries of 
the United States, particularly China and Russia, are integrating technology to increase the 
stand-off across all the domains, to include cyber.7 Adversaries and potential adversaries 
of the United States will challenge our freedom of maneuver and action in all domains in 
the near future, to include both cyberspace and the information environment. For example, 
during its military operations in Ukraine starting in 2014, Russia successfully tested its 
ability to integrate information operations, electronic warfare, and cyberspace operations 
with maneuver and special operations to achieve their objectives in dynamic hybrid 
 
6 Crane, “The United States Needs an Information Warfare Command.”  
7 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028, iii. 
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warfare.8 Similarly, China appears increasingly willing to employ cyberspace as a way to 
both subvert U.S. technical supremacy and counter U.S. influence on a global scale.9 
Clearly, the body of evidence suggests that adversaries of the U.S. are bringing information 
warfare to scale.  
In response, the U.S. Army in MDO will strive to develop multi-domain formations 
to “pose multiple and compounding dilemmas on the adversary.”10 The information 
environment, consisting of the physical, information, and cognitive dimensions will 
become increasingly more congested as forces become more reliant on technology and 
digital communications.11 In a degraded, denied, or congested information environment or 
electromagnetic spectrum, complete freedom of maneuver in cyberspace will not be 
guaranteed. During competition or armed conflict, the Army in MDO must effectively 
manage its cyber, space, and information related forces to protect its relatively unimpeded 
use of the dimensions of the information environment while simultaneously creating 
advantage and opportunity for the commander. 
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 discusses another evolution of contemporary 
information operations to information environment operations (IEO). In IEO, commanders 
and their staff will synchronize information related capabilities to seek advantage over 
adversaries and consolidate gains in the information environment.12 While conducting 
multi-domain operations, the Army will rapidly execute operations and integrate 
capabilities in all domains, including the EMS and the information environment to 
 
8 Aaron F. Brantly, Nerea M. Cal, and Devlin P. Winkelstein, Defending the Borderland: Ukrainian 
Military Experiences with IO, Cyber, and EW, Report Number AD1046052 (West Point, NY: Army Cyber 
Institute, 2017), 3, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1046052.pdf.  
9 Brandon Valeriano, Benjamin Jensen, and Ryan Maness, Cyber Strategy: The Evolving Character of 
Power and Coercion, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), loc. 3353, Kindle. 
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maximize effects on the enemy. These synergistic operations will seek to create overmatch 
with the enemy with mutually reinforcing effects.13 
A 2018 Congressional Research Service Report on information warfare outlines a 
bifurcation of information strategy and cyberspace operations at the national level, 
explaining that the Department of Defense support structures for information operations 
and cyberspace operations are treated separately, both organizationally and doctrinally.14 
In the report, the author posits whether the Defense Department and U.S. structures are 
configured in a manner that maximizes the potential of both information warfare and 
cyberspace operations. Moreover, this report cites that U.S. Cyber Command (USCC) 
focuses more on offensive cyber operations than the “cognitive and strategic effects of 
information.” As the Army plans a doctrinal shift to multi-domain operations, the Army 
must maximize the interoperability and growing relationship between cyberspace 
operations and information operations to properly and effectively create multiple and 
compounding effects on the enemy.  
Clearly, current DOD policy and doctrine guidance on the employment of IO does 
not yet reflect the rapidly occurring shift towards MDO and information warfare. To 
adequately prepare our IO professionals for success in the information environment, we 
must reconcile this disparity between what IO is and what it needs to be. In the following 
chapter, “Army IO in Design: A Critical Examination of IO Doctrine,” we further examine 
the shortfalls, challenges, and other issues regarding the U.S. Army’s IO structure, and the 
implications towards its ability to execute IO in current and future conflict.  
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III. ARMY IO IN DESIGN: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF IO 
DOCTRINE 
A. INTRODUCTION: UNDERSTANDING IO 
Without a doubt, IO is a challenging concept to comprehend. Understanding IO 
requires a technical familiarization with a variety of existing and emerging capabilities, an 
understanding of the dynamics of information transmission in a given operating 
environment, and the ability to comprehend the cognitive nuances of both friendly and 
adversary decision-making. By design, IO requires a blending of technical and abstract 
concepts that are made even more challenging to understand due to the evolving nature of 
the information environment and rapid advancements in technology. As a result, the U.S. 
Army lacks a shared understanding of IO across the entire force, impacting its ability to 
leverage information in combat. In this chapter, our purpose is to outline key components 
of IO in design through a critical examination and commentary of applicable doctrine, 
training, and education. The intent is to provide an analysis of where the U.S. Army’s 
doctrinal approach to IO both succeeds and fails to bring about a shared understanding of 
IO as well as create a coherent strategy to accomplish information operations. This analysis 
provides a baseline understanding of the U.S. Army’s IO concept and introduces the issues 
described later in this research project. Because the scope of this research project is limited 
to the U.S. Army, we will focus on Joint and U.S. Army doctrine, although it is beneficial 
for U.S. Army IO practitioners to familiarize themselves with the concepts employed by 
the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force.  
B. IO DEFINED 
The most central place to begin a discussion about Army IO is the doctrinal 
definition. The primary Department of Defense (DOD) IO policy document, DOD 
Directive (DoDD) 3600.01, Information Operations, describes IO as “the principal 
mechanism used during military operations to integrate, synchronize, employ, and assess 
a wide variety of information-related capabilities (IRCs) in concert with other lines of 
operations to effect adversaries’ or potential adversaries’ decision-making while protecting 
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our own.”15 Joint doctrine similarly describes IO as “the integrated employment, during 
military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of 
operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and 
potential adversaries while protecting our own.”16 In a prudent effort to align U.S. Army 
and Joint IO doctrine, the U.S. Army currently uses the Joint definition of IO as its formal 
definition.17  
Although IO is an amorphous concept, from these definitions one can easily 
extrapolate two defined goals of IO: Attack the enemy’s decision making and protect 
friendly decision making. If this were solely the case, it would be neither challenging to 
explain Army IO, nor would it be difficult to convince leaders, staffs, and soldiers of its 
utility in combat operations. However, this simplified definition inadequately captures the 
true scope of the application of IO in the U.S. Army. Notably, immediately following the 
Joint definition listed above, U.S. Army IO doctrine adds a less-cited expansion to its 
definition of IO: “This manual uses the term IO comprehensively to capture all activity 
employed to affect the information environment and contribute to operations in and 
through the information environment.”18 With this small addition to the description, the 
U.S. Army now effectively expands IO to encompass any activity that impacts, transits, 
and leverages the information environment. 
The U.S. Army’s expanded definition more accurately reflects its application of IO 
than the original definition. It also more accurately underscores the prevalence of IO across 
all military operations and the monumental impact of the information environment on 
military outcomes. Furthermore, the U.S. Army’s extremely broad paradigm on IO is 
rightfully designed so that commanders and IO planners are not constrained, at least by 
 
15 Department of Defense, Information Operations, DoDD 3600.01, (Washington, DC: Department of 
Defense, 2013), https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d3600_01.pdf. 
16 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Information Operations, JP 3-13, (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2014), ix, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_13.pdf. 
17 Department of the Army, Information Operations, FM 3-13 (Washington, DC: Department of the 
Army, 2016), https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/FM%203-
13%20FINAL%20WEB.pdf. 
18 Department of the Army, Information Operations, 1-2. 
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doctrine. However, the vague expanded definition does little to alleviate confusion as to 
the mandate, scope, and boundaries of IO, which contributes to an overall lack of shared 
understanding in the U.S. Army. 
C. INFORMATION RELATED CAPABILITIES (IRCS) AND IO 
The answer to “who conducts IO” is equally as vague and potentially confusing as 
defining IO. As stated previously, IO itself is simply an umbrella term for a category of 
operations which impact, transit, or leverage the information environment, according to the 
U.S. Army. More specifically, it is important to understand that IO is not a capability itself 
but rather an integrating and coordinating function in which the goal is to synchronize 
information effects with each other and with maneuver operations. Military units conduct 
IO through both kinetic activities and a variety of information related capabilities (IRCs).19 
Therefore, to answer the above question, IRCs are the “doers” that physically execute 
information operations, each one affecting a different aspect of the information 
environment or using different ways or means to leverage the information environment and 
support accomplishment of military objectives. 
However, much like defining IO itself, the boundaries surrounding the 
categorization of IRCs are broad and vague. Perhaps the most concise description resides 
in the 2003 version of Field Manual (FM) 3–13, Information Operations, which outlines 
five “core capabilities” of IO: electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations 
(CNO - encompassing computer network attack, defense, and exploitation), psychological 
operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC).20 
Though outdated, this list of core IRCs provides a simple, clearly defined explanation of 
the U.S. Army’s larger IO construct. Of course, as the scope of U.S. Army IO increased, 
these core capabilities alone could not sufficiently account for the breadth of activities that 
impact and transit the information environment. This is why the previous version of FM 
3-13 also included “supporting elements:” physical destruction, information assurance 
 
19 Department of the Army, 1-3. 
20 Department of the Army, 1-13. 
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(IA), physical security, counterintelligence, counter-deception, and counter-propaganda.21 
Of note, according to this version of FM 3-13, it is important to distinguish that the 
employment of any one of these activities does not comprise IO itself, but rather 
“independent activities that, when taken together and synchronized, constitute IO.”22 In 
other words, an IRC by itself is not IO and does not become IO until synthesized with other 
capabilities towards a unified information-related end state, according to U.S. Army 
doctrine.  
Unfortunately, this explanation does little to clarify exactly when and where an 
information operation starts and ends. For example, how many IRCs must be employed 
before an operation becomes an information operation? Why should the employment of a 
single IRC, such as a PSYOP broadcast or EW jamming, not be considered an information 
operation even though it is clearly impacting the information environment? When is 
“physical destruction” considered an IRC, as opposed to just physical destruction? The 
open-ended nature of the description of these IRCs invites ambiguity and general 
confusion. The legal ramifications of this confusion could be significant. Depending on the 
mission or geographic region, there are normally specific legal authorities associated with 
IO. Unclear boundaries regarding when the unit is engaging in IO or not can create legal 
complications that can hinder mission accomplishment. Even so, these boundaries remain 
largely under-defined and poorly understood. 
The current version of FM 3-13 provides some answers to these questions while 
raising new issues. FM 3-13 defines an IRC as “a tool, technique, or activity employed 
within a dimension of the information environment that can be used to create effects and 
operationally desirable conditions.”23 Although this definition is still extraordinarily 
broad, the current manual clarifies that IRCs are generally those activities whose effects 
are primarily based in the information environment, to include cyberspace. In the manual, 
these are referred to as twelve “daily practice” IRCs, which are MILDEC, military 
 
21 Department of the Army, 1-14. 
22 Department of the Army, 2-1. 
23 Department of the Army, 1-3. 
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information support operations (MISO—formerly PSYOP), soldier and leader engagement 
(SLE), civil affairs operations (CAO), combat camera (embedded units that capture and 
produce battlefield still and video imagery), OPSEC, public affairs, cyberspace 
electromagnetic activities (CEMA), EW, cyberspace operations, space operations, and 
special technical operations (STO).24 These IRCs constitute what would generally be 
considered the “core” capabilities of IO in today’s Army. 
Additionally, current IO doctrine elaborates that supporting activities in the 
physical dimension can indeed impact the information environment, and thus outlines 
additional enabling activities: commander’s communication strategy, presence, posture, 
and profile (P3), foreign disclosure, physical security, physical maneuver, special access 
programs, civil-military operations (CMO), intelligence, and destruction or lethal 
actions.25 Clearly, the addition of these enabling activities broadens the scope of IO 
capabilities to nearly all military activity. The document acknowledges this, offering the 
following analogy:  
The formal definition of IRCs encourages commanders and staffs to employ 
all available resources when seeking to affect the information environment 
to operational advantage. For example, if artillery fires are employed to 
destroy communications infrastructure that enables enemy decision making, 
then artillery is an IRC in this instance.26  
To be clear, most commanders and staffs would likely not consider artillery an IRC 
under almost any circumstance. However, the point is well taken. In fact, the increasingly 
broad scope of what can be considered an IRC is very beneficial for IO practitioners, who 
otherwise might find themselves too constrained to develop plans that sufficiently impact 
the information environment based on available capabilities. Conversely, the 
aforementioned uncertainty regarding the boundaries of IO remains, which creates 
implications for the U.S. Army’s ongoing efforts to develop a coherent IO strategy. 
 
24 Department of the Army, 1-3. 
25 Department of the Army, 1-3. 
26 Department of the Army, 1-3. 
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Because the U.S. Army approach to IO is largely modeled after Joint doctrine, it is 
not surprising that the definition and scope of IRCs in JP 3-13 is similarly broad. Joint 
doctrine outlines fourteen military capabilities that either directly create effects in the 
information environment or otherwise factor significantly into IO planning and integration: 
strategic communication (SC), joint interagency coordination, public affairs, CMO, 
cyberspace operations, information assurance, space operations, MISO, intelligence, 
MILDEC, OPSEC, joint electromagnetic spectrum operations (JEMSO), and key leader 
engagement (KLE).27 Similarly, JP 3-13 acknowledges that there are “many” other 
capabilities that contribute to IO and therefore the list is not all-inclusive.28 Like the other 
doctrinal references we examine in this section, this caveat indicates that military units can 
leverage nearly any military capability or activity as an IRC. 
This examination of IRCs in doctrine reveals several notable insights. First, the 
scope of what the U.S. Army considers an IRC has expanded significantly from the original 
five core IRCs to the fourteen core IRCs in today’s Joint publication. Additionally, modern 
Joint and Army IO doctrine universally includes caveats that military units can leverage 
nearly any type of capability or activity towards operations in the information environment. 
Therefore, much like the U.S. Army expanded definition of IO that encompasses nearly 
any operations that create effects within the information environment, so too are IRCs 
defined as nearly any capability that impacts the information environment. This broad 
paradigm has both positive and negative implications. On the one hand, military 
commanders are not doctrinally constrained with what capabilities they can leverage to 
plan and execute IO. This is both convenient for military planners and accurately 
representative of the reality of the modern information environment. On the other hand, 
just as the expanded definition of IO falls short of providing a clear shared understanding 
of the concept, the nearly limitless scope of IRCs creates ambiguity at an institutional level 
regarding who participates in IO. This negatively impacts the U.S. Army’s ability to 
 
27 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Information Operations, II-5 through II-13. 
28 Joint Chiefs of Staff, II-5. 
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develop an identity amongst its IO professionals, which we will examine in detail in 
Chapter V – SNA and Social Identity Theory in the Army IO Profession. 
D. THE ROLE OF IO OFFICERS (FA30S) 
Considering the involvement of dozens of individual IRCs in IO, it is not surprising 
that the U.S. Army prudently created an occupational specialty whose primary duty is to 
synchronize, coordinate, and integrate information effects into unit operations. This 
position is the IO Officer, sometimes referred to as an FA30, which is short for its career 
field designation of Functional Area 30. FM 3-13 explains the IO Officer as the “staff focal 
point for IO,” responsible for analyzing the information environment, identifying IRCs for 
each operation, synchronizing those IRCs with each other and the overall operation, and 
assessing the effectiveness of IO throughout, among many other specified and implied 
tasks.29 The Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 600–3 section on IO similarly 
describes that the “IO officer is the staff expert for military information environment 
effects, military deception, operations security, information protection, social media 
interaction, and information-focused military and civil engagement,” and that “IO planning 
and coordination also supports cyberspace operations and electronic warfare, presence, 
posture and profile, physical destruction and deliberate influencing of foreign target 
audiences in support of operations conducted in a designated area of operations.”30 The 
DA Pamphlet also outlines eight “Unique Knowledge and Skills of an Information 
Operations Officer” as well as nine “Functional Competencies.” Duties and responsibilities 
of the IO Officer include leading the IO working group and serving as the leader of the IO 
cell on larger staffs. On smaller staffs, such as brigade-sized elements that are still 
authorized the position, the IO Officer may be the sole advocate for operations in the 
information environment on the entire staff.  
To continue the discussion on the design and application of IO, it is important to 
distinguish the role of the Army IO Officer from that of individual IRCs. IO Officers serve 
 
29 Department of the Army, Information Operations, 3-4. 
30 Department of the Army, Information Operations Functional Area, DA PAM 600-3 Smartbook 
(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2017), https://www.milsuite.mil/book/groups/smartbook-da-
pam-600-3, 1-2. 
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on staff elements to plan, integrate, and assess IO while IRCs execute information related 
effects in support of operations, IO or otherwise. In one of the great ironies of U.S. Army 
IO design, IO Officers do not actually execute IO themselves. On occasion, an IO Officer 
might bear responsibility for a certain technical IRC if that capability is owned at the staff 
level, but this is rare and typically by exception. Instead, IO Officers perform their duty as 
coordinators, synchronizers, and assessors with neither the authority nor the mandate to 
dictate the actions of IRCs on the battlefield. Additionally, IO Officers do not “own” any 
IRCs, which generally subscribe to their own chain of command. The relationship is well 
summarized in JP 3-13, where “IO is not about ownership of individual capabilities but 
rather the use of those capabilities as force multipliers to create a desired effect.”31 This is 
an important distinction because otherwise there is a potential for conflict between IO 
Officers and IRCs if the relationship is misunderstood or not well-defined from the 
beginning. The personal experiences of the authors indicate that this misconception is 
prevalent in the U.S. Army and should be considered an important issue regarding IO in 
design. 
E. TRAINING AND EDUCATION OF IO OFFICERS 
Army IO Officers do not commission directly into the career field, as is the case 
with most U.S. Army basic branches. Instead, the U.S. Army IO career field is known as a 
functional area, which is “a grouping of officers by technical specialty or skills other than 
an arm, service, or branch that usually requires unique education, training, and 
experience.”32 This means that Army IO Officers serve in an Army basic branch for the 
beginning of their career before applying to transfer to become an IO Officer. Although the 
requirements fluctuate by application cycle, generally an officer is eligible to transfer upon 
completion of their branch key developmental assignments at the rank of O-3 or O-4. As a 
result, the earliest that an officer may request a transfer into the IO career field is around 
the seven-year mark, while most transfers occur either as a senior captain or a junior major. 
 
31 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Information Operations, II-5. 
32 Department of the Army, Officer Professional Development and Career Management, DA PAM 
600-3, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, April 3, 2019), 11. 
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Nearly any officer from any basic branch may request a transfer to become an IO officer, 
provided that their originating branch authorizes them to pursue the transfer application. A 
top-secret/sensitive compartmented information access is also required to be considered 
for the position, and the U.S. Army encourages applicants who can operate with unified 
action partners, are “culturally astute” and understand the “challenges and complexities of 
the operational environment.”33 
Notably, there is no requirement to have served in an IRC career field to apply for 
a transfer into the FA30 career field. Furthermore, no requirement exists for applicants to 
have any other training, education, or academic background in any information-related 
vocation or field of study, although the application board would likely view those 
backgrounds favorably. As a result, the IO profession consists of an expansive and diverse 
set of backgrounds from nearly every basic branch in the Army, but very few individuals 
have prior hands-on experience with IRCs before becoming an IO Officer.  
Once selected to become an IO Officer, students attend the U.S. Army IO 
Qualification Course (IOQC) at the earliest opportunity to become certified to perform 
their new duties. The IOQC consists of 12 weeks of instruction designed to certify 
individuals to become IO and MILDEC officers.34 The course focuses on the 
familiarization and integration of IRCs, application of IO into the Military Decision 
Making Process (MDMP), IO targeting and assessment, and a capstone event designed to 
“develop the students’ ability to plan, prepare, execute, and assess the integration of IRCs 
and to adapt tactics, techniques, and procedures throughout Unified Land Operations 
within a decisive action training environment.”35 Recently, the U.S. Army IO Proponent 
(USAIOP), which oversees the IOQC, conducted an extensive curriculum review which 
resulted in an enhanced emphasis on large scale combat operations (LSCO) as well as an 
extensive 10-day MILDEC block of instruction.36  
 
33 Department of the Army, IO Functional Area, 1. 
34 “IO Qualification Course (IOQC),” United States Army Combined Arms Center, accessed October 
10th 2020, https://usacac.army.mil/organizations/mccoe/iop/ioqc. 
35 United States Army Combined Arms Center, “IO Qualification Course (IOQC).” 
36 United States Army Combined Arms Center, “IO Qualification Course (IOQC).”  
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The 12-week IOQC is the only formal IO education course required to perform 
duties as an IO Officer. However, like most vocations, the U.S. Army expects IO 
professionals to seek out continuing education in the form of advanced IO training and 
specialized courses regarding individual IRCs. Many IO Officers attend courses offered by 
the 1st IO Command Training and Analysis Branch, which conducts both resident and 
mobile IO-related training and education courses. 1st IO Command offers these courses to 
both IO Officers and non-IO Officers alike, including integration courses on key IRCs such 
as EW, MISO, and Cyberspace Operations, planners’ courses on military deception and 
tactical IO, and even an IO fundamentals course.37 The Training and Analysis Branch also 
produces adversary information warfare seminars, focusing on Russia, China, North Korea, 
and Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs).38 Through these courses, 1st IO Command 
provides opportunities for Army IO Officers to build on their education from the IOQC 
and develop their planning skills in specific areas of expertise. 
Besides the IO training available at 1st IO Command, many FA30s attend a 
multitude of other advanced training and education opportunities offered by various 
organizations throughout the Army, Joint Force, and Interagency. The Joint Forces Staff 
College (JFSC) at the National Defense University (NDU) offers the Joint IO Planners’ 
Course (JIOPC), the purpose of which is to educate IO Officers and others “to plan, 
integrate, and synchronize IO into joint operational-level plans and orders.”39 JFSC also 
offers the Joint MILDEC Training Course, which provides crucial training on how to plan 
and integrate MILDEC.40 Another example of advanced IO training is the Information 
Environment Advanced Analysis (IEAA) course, sponsored by JMark Services, Inc., 
which trains students to “characterize, forecast, target, wargame and assess the information 
 
37 “1st IO Cmd Training and Analysis Branch,” 1st IO Command, accessed October 10th 2020, 
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39 “Joint Information Operations Planners’ Course,” Joint Forces Staff College, accessed October 5, 
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environment in support of a commander’s decision-making process.”41 These are just 
several examples of additional IO training. Numerous other training and education 
opportunities exist on almost any IRC or aspect of the information environment, including 
STO, space, OPSEC, and interagency support. 
Finally, IO Officers may seek graduate-level IO education opportunities, as 
outlined in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3210.01C, Joint 
IO Proponent. The Joint IO Proponent reviews and approved IO-related graduate-level 
education (GLE) programs for the joint force. The aforementioned programs at NDU as 
well as the graduate programs at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) are currently the 
only GLE programs approved by the Joint IO Proponent.42 Many U.S. Army IO Officers 
attend the curriculum 698 program at NPS, Information Strategy and Political Warfare, 
which educates students on “the psychological and social dimensions of war emphasizing 
information strategy, political warfare, military deception, defense support to public 
diplomacy analytical methods, and regional studies.”43 Together, these IO GLE programs 
are “designed to provide OSD, the Joint Staff, and the CCMDs with a cadre of academically 
educated professionals who are prepared to provide IO related policy expertise at the 
strategic and strategic-operational levels.”44  
Several potential challenges exist in the U.S. Army’s current model of training, 
educating, and employing IO Officers. Although a multitude of additional training and 
education opportunities exist for IO Officers, an IO Officer might not have the opportunity 
to attend due to mission requirements, deployments, scheduling conflicts, temporary duty 
(TDY) funding constraints, or any other potential issues. As a result, in those cases, their 
only formal IO education is the 12-week IOQC. An alternative model might involve a 
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shifting of resources to incorporate some of these additional and advanced training 
opportunities into the IOQC itself, thereby eliminating the possibility that an IO Officer 
might not be able to receive the opportunity later. This investment in education could 
produce significant dividends towards the overall competency and confidence of the U.S. 
Army’s IO profession. Additionally, the IO Officer position’s status as a functional area is 
potentially inadequate given the ever-increasing importance of the information 
environment on military operations. We further explore this recommendation and the 
concept of social identity in the Army IO profession in Chapter V. 
F. IO PLANNING AND ASSESSMENT 
By design, Army IO Officers are responsible for planning, integrating, and 
assessing IO. In U.S. Army IO doctrine, the process for planning IO largely mirrors the 
military decision-making process (MDMP), with IO-related tasks alongside each step of 
the planning process.45 Similarly, Joint doctrine superimposes the IO planning process 
onto the Joint Operations Planning Process (JOPP).46 Army IO targeting integration 
likewise reflects existing targeting methodology, including Decide, Detect, Deliver, Assess 
(D3A).47 Unquestionably, it is prudent for U.S. Army IO doctrine to reflect maneuver 
operations whenever possible. Aside from the obvious advantage of optimally 
synchronizing and coordinating effects, any common language between IO and maneuver 
operations helps the U.S. Army as an institution move closer towards a common, shared 
understanding of IO. 
G. EMERGING CONCEPTS: IO, CYBERSPACE, AND MDO 
U.S. Army doctrine is transitioning to concepts that demand an increased emphasis 
on the information environment, particularly cyberspace. Currently, U.S. Army doctrine is 
developed to support unified land operations (ULO). In ULO, Army practitioners seek to 
employ IO and cyberspace operations to garner and create conditions that will support 
 
45 Department of the Army, Information Operations, 4-1 through 4-28. 
46 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Information Operations, IV-1 through IV-10. 
47 Department of the Army, Information Operations, 7-1 through 7-7. 
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achieving success for the force. As Army Field Manual 3-12 describes, cyberspace 
operations, properly coordinated with similar and complementary capabilities, will 
“provide a decisive advantage to commanders at all levels in modern combat.”48 However, 
the Army is currently planning for a transition from ULO to multi-domain operations 
(MDO), in which a significant portion of all operations in the information environment are 
expected to utilize, transit, or otherwise leverage cyberspace in some form. As a result, 
U.S. Army and practitioners of both CO and IO must understand and shape the role that 
each will play to continue to provide support to the Army and the joint force.  
In the foreword of the Training and Doctrine Command pamphlet on The U.S. 
Army in multi-domain operations (MDO), 2028, General Milley illustrates that adversaries 
of the United States, particularly China and Russia, are integrating technology to increase 
the stand-off across all the domains, to include cyber.49 Adversaries of the United States 
will challenge our freedom of maneuver and action in all domains in the near future, to 
include both cyberspace and the information environment. The U.S. Army in MDO will 
strive to develop multi-domain formations to “pose multiple and compounding dilemmas 
on the adversary.”50 This will require the Army to integrate and execute cyberspace 
operations and information warfare to achieve effects at all levels of war, from tactical to 
strategic. To do so, the relationship between cyberspace operations and information 
warfare will be more integrated than it is currently. Cyberspace operations will extend the 
influence and range of information warfare, and information warfare will provide 
complementary effects for cyberspace operations. Both functions must retain flexibility 
and adaptability to respond to agile adversaries in contested environments.51  
The U.S. Army in MDO must understand the information environment to include 
cyberspace, space, and the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS).52 Army Field Manual 3-12 
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describes cyberspace as a global domain that resides within the information environment.53 
This supports the inherent relationship between the two functions and their codependence. 
The adversary enjoys relative freedom of maneuver in these dimensions and therefore the 
friendly force must understand their activities to fully appreciate the operational 
environment. To gain an advantage in either competition or conflict, leaders and 
practitioners in the Army must fully understand, analyze, and integrate operations in 
cyberspace, space, and the EMS. These areas are inherently related, and none can fully 
realize maximum potential when operations are isolated each individually. As Valeriano et 
al. indicate, operations in cyberspace are more effective when they are conducted in 
coordination with other efforts.54  
The information environment, consisting of the physical, information, and 
cognitive dimensions will become increasingly more congested as friendly, neutral, and 
enemy forces become more reliant on technology and digital communications.55 In a 
degraded, denied, or congested information environment or electromagnetic spectrum, 
complete freedom of maneuver in cyberspace will not be guaranteed. The Army Field 
Manual on CEMA describes superiority in cyberspace as the ability for the force to freely 
conduct operations in cyberspace.56 During competition or armed conflict, the Army in 
MDO must effectively manage its cyber, space, and information related forces to protect 
its relatively unimpeded use of the dimensions of the information environment. To ensure 
this freedom of maneuver for Army cyber forces, IO practitioners must ensure that 
sufficient deconfliction and coordination of operations are conducted to avoid degrading 
the effects of the disparate information related capabilities.  
Furthermore, a key aspect of Army IO is to enable and protect friendly decision 
making.57 With a growing relationship and integration of cyberspace operations into Army 
operations, IO will increasingly develop techniques and processes for protecting the 
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cyberspace element of friendly decision-making. Protecting our forces’ ability to use the 
EMS and the information environment, including digital communications and networks 
will be paramount to the Army and joint force in both competition and throughout the range 
of military operations.  
As the United States Army continues to understand, develop, and integrate the 
relationship between cyberspace operations, information operations, and information 
warfare, practitioners must understand the role of each in Army and Joint operations. 
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 suggests that in MDO, information operations must transition 
to operations in the information environment (OIE). There are nuanced, but clear 
differences between the two definitions. OIE includes operations “to influence enemy 
formations and populations to reduce their will to fight; and influence friendly and neutral 
populations to enable friendly operations.”58 OIE as a function highlights the core 
responsibility to “influence, deceive, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of 
enemies and adversaries.”59 Although already considered a function of information 
operations, OIE seeks to formalize the function of deception in its definition. An important 
aspect of both definitions is that both OIE and IO are conducted “in concert with other lines 
of operations”60 to achieve outcomes favorable to friendly forces. These other lines of 
operation will continue to take advantage of the capabilities of the Army’s cyber forces, as 
well as joint, inter-agency, national, and multi-national assets.  
The emergence of OIE onto an already crowded field of inter-related terms and 
definitions is a continuation of the identity crisis that has plagued Army IO for years; a 
point we examine further in Chapter V. In the following chapter, we examine these issues 
in IO design that have impacted the U.S. Army’s ability to plan and execute IO and the 
implications for future conflict. 
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IV. IO IN PRACTICE 
A. CHALLENGES OF EFFECTIVE AND COMPLETE INTEGRATION 
In a time when great power competition, hybrid warfare, and gray zone conflict are 
commonplace topics of discussion in political and military circles of the United States, the 
U.S. Army must examine its current training and education systems in order to poise for 
future operations. In most recent circumstances, the United States was able to employ a 
significant technical and military overmatch in conflicts it has been a part of. This 
overmatch allowed for a tactical and operational advantage in almost every situation where 
the U.S. military employed its conventional capabilities to achieve its objectives. As 
contemporary adversaries and potential adversaries continue to close the technological and 
military capabilities gap between themselves and the United States, the U.S. Army should 
revisit some of its marginalized capabilities in order to maintain this advantage and remain 
competitive. During situations where the United States Army cannot apply its full force, or 
political considerations limit the application of kinetic weapons, military deception and 
information operations can be an effective complementary effort towards achieving Army 
objectives. These capabilities must be fully and deliberately integrated within Army 
operations and rehearsed and practiced thoroughly to be an effective combat multiplier.  
At the institutional level, the U.S. Army is beginning to elevate information 
operations to the level necessary to compete with its adversaries. Army Cyber Command 
(ARCYBER) is enhancing its capabilities and scope with the goal of transforming into a 
multi-domain-capable information warfare command by 2028.61 Simultaneously, 
revolutionary Army-wide organizational concepts such as the Multi-Domain Task Force 
(MDTF), Theater Information Command (TIC), and Information Warfare Brigades will 
bring rapid, adaptive information effects to expeditionary units on future battlefields.62 
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Why then, if the U.S. Army is finally beginning to emphasize IO and invest more 
resources at the institutional level, does it still face significant challenges implementing IO 
at the tactical level? Unfortunately, the U.S. Army remains locked in an archaic cultural 
mindset that disproportionately favors combat power, lethal effects, and technical 
overmatch in the physical dimension while marginalizing or even ignoring the information 
environment. Instead, the U.S. Army should adjust its organizational culture to align with 
the reality of combat in the information age, where combatants who are proficient in the 
art of IO can neutralize or counterbalance the overwhelming military force of their 
opponent. This chapter summarizes the various challenges that the U.S. Army faces 
implementing IO at the tactical maneuver unit level based on recurring trends from the 
Army’s maneuver combat training centers, and then describes how emphasizing IO in 
junior to intermediate-level professional military education (PME) can facilitate cultural 
change and reverse those trends. It also addresses the education and training of Army 
information operations officers in a core competency of the IO field, military deception, 
and recommends a revitalized focus on this capability.  
B. TACTICAL IO TRAINING AT ARMY COMBAT TRAINING CENTERS 
Information operations in the U.S. Army is a complementary function to maneuver 
warfare that integrates and synchronizes information-related capabilities in order to create 
unique effects and conditions for the friendly force by coordinating operations in the 
information environment.63 As Matthew Fecteau discusses in his Global Security Review 
article, there are differences between how many interpret and understand the role of 
information operations, but the general characteristics of IO remain largely the same.64 
These operations and activities are executed in the information environment, but their 
effects and purposes are likely, and generally intended to, affect and introduce conditions 
across the domains of warfare. Information operations, by leveraging the expertise and 
capabilities of the experts across the information warfare community and integrating them 
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into operations, can introduce conditions and effects that will allow for the U.S. Army to 
continue to operate with a tactical and operational advantage. For Army IO to perform this 
function, it must be conducted in concert with other lines of operation. As McArdle points 
out in her War on the Rocks article, information operations and specifically military 
deception, must be seamlessly integrated with operations.65 Reinforcing this, Walter Jajko 
recommends that “the planning, and practice of deception ought to be systematically 
integrated into military strategy.”66 
Understanding that Army information operations are executed in support of 
achieving friendly force objectives as a complementary effort, how does the Army get 
closer to fully realizing and understanding the role, function, and importance of IO in its 
operations? Much like it employs and validates its other tasks and missions, the Army’s 
Combat Training Centers (CTC) may provide the appropriate venue. A great resource for 
understanding the strengths and weaknesses of information operations capabilities in 
tactical maneuver units are these three maneuver CTCs: The Joint Readiness Training 
Center (JRTC), the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC), and the National 
Training Center (NTC).67 These sprawling, state-of-the-art training centers simulate 
realistic combat environments in which tactical maneuver units undergo complex training 
scenarios. In many cases, these exercises serve as the final validation mechanism for 
tactical maneuver units before assuming a real-world mission. More so, when consolidated 
over time, CTC data can provide valuable insight into broader recurring trends throughout 
the U.S. Army. By examining these trends concerning the tactical application of IO, one 
gains an understanding of the unfortunate scope of the problem. 
In practice, the Army understands the importance of rehearsals and exercises in 
verifying and validating its units’ critical tasks and prioritizes these exercises accordingly. 
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The U.S. Army brigade is the unit bridges the tactical and operational levels. Commanded 
by an O-6, brigades are deployed to execute their assigned missions. Pre-deployment, 
brigades conduct a validating exercise at one of the Army’s CTCs. These CTCs provide 
the terrain, opposition force (OPFOR), and observer controller-trainers (OC-Ts) for the 
rotational unit (RTU) to conduct its validating exercise pre-deployment. It is during these 
CTC exercises that the RTU, the deploying brigade, receives its most accurate and realistic 
assessment of its ability to conduct the warfighting functions and execute its critical and 
mission essential tasks. For this section, we examine IO-related trends from each maneuver 
CTC based on exercise after-action reviews to gain an understanding of widespread issues 
regarding IO application at the tactical level. Figure 1 outlines the most frequently 
occurring IO-related trends.68  
Figure 1. IO trends at maneuver CTCs69 
68 Felix Figueroa, personal communication, May 26, 2020. 
69 Source: Felix Figueroa, personal communication, May 26, 2020. 
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Most notably, IO is systemically desynchronized, underdeveloped, or missing 
entirely from overall unit operations. This directly conflicts with IO planning guidance 
described in both Joint and Army IO doctrine, which uniformly emphasizes the importance 
of integrating IO planning with maneuver operations early and throughout the mission.70 
Additionally, units rarely include an IO working group into their regular planning cycle, 
and IO target nominations are either underdeveloped or unused. Furthermore, tactical units 
rarely consider IO when developing their overall mission statements, key tasks, desired 
end-state, or guidance to subordinate units. These omissions undoubtedly signal a lack of 
importance to subordinate units at the ground level. Unsurprisingly, these subordinate units 
are therefore more likely to perform their simulated missions without concern for inevitable 
ramifications in the information environment.  
The Army’s decision within the last decade to eliminate the full-time Brigade IO 
Officer position,71 which had previously been the sole advocate for IO in the entire tactical 
maneuver unit, further compounds the problem. Today, units executing CTC rotations 
either leave the position vacant or fill it on an ad hoc basis, sometimes designating an 
unqualified individual as the IO planner immediately before or even during the training 
exercise. Simply restoring the Brigade IO Officer position would be a welcome step in the 
right direction, but it is an incomplete solution regarding fixing the overall culture problem. 
A single staff officer is most likely not empowered enough to reverse a deeply rooted 
cultural issue like the one the U.S. Army currently faces regarding IO. A more suitable 
solution to achieve lasting change should include both a top-down approach through 
leadership emphasis and a bottom-up approach through education. As mentioned earlier, 
the U.S. Army’s improving attitude towards IO at the highest institutional level must 
continue to gain momentum and then permeate down to the level of tactical 
implementation.  
With no organic information operations officer on the brigade staff and information 
operations being a mere footnote in Army professional education, the brigade is going to 
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enter CTC rotations at a relative disadvantage for incorporating information operations. 
These disadvantages can be overcome through a deliberate effort by the commander and 
staff to understand the information environment of the training center. It is also incumbent 
on the brigade’s higher headquarters, the division, to adequately prepare the brigade to 
conduct operations in the information environment. With a more aptly suited IO staff 
section at the division level, this section must take appropriate measures to prepare their 
subordinate brigades for CTC rotations through training and education. 
C. IO EDUCATION IN PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION (PME) 
Undoubtedly, the concerning trends regarding the tactical performance of IO at 
CTCs are partly a result of the inadequate level of IO-related education that mid-level 
officers receive during their PME. For example, at the Command and General Staff College 
(CGSC), students attending intermediate level education (ILE) receive only two hours’ 
worth of dedicated IO instruction out of the entire year-long curriculum.72 Furthermore, 
military deception is only offered as an elective, and many students graduate without 
understanding, let alone becoming proficient in this art. Since the officers attending ILE at 
CGSC are likely to become the next tactical operations officers, executive officers, and 
commanders at the brigade level, one could reasonably hypothesize a correlation between 
the lack of intermediate-level IO education and the performance of IO by tactical maneuver 
units during CTC rotations. 
Therefore, it follows that perhaps the single most important step towards improving 
the U.S. Army’s culture and performance in the information environment is to prioritize 
IO and deception in military education programs, especially ILE. This can help the U.S. 
Army achieve a cultural mindset of what RAND Corporation social scientist Christopher 
Paul calls “communication mindedness,” a mentality where effects in and through the 
information environment are always at the forefront of operations and in the decision-
making of commanders and staff.73 Dr. Paul further advocates that “PME for even junior 
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officers should include introductory material on the possible contributions of informing, 
influencing, and persuading.”74 An ideal revision of junior to mid-level officer PME 
programs would elevate IO to the level of “core competency” akin to other aspects of 
leadership and tactics emphasized throughout the curriculum. This model would retain the 
existing block of instruction dedicated to IO while adding the consideration of effects and 
impacts on the information environment as a critical learning objective to all other relevant 
blocks of instruction. Additionally, all practical exercises in any PME course should 
challenge students to integrate information-related effects and shape the information 
environment to the maximum extent possible. This curriculum reform strategy would 
naturally mesh IO into the existing course structure without inundating students and 
instructors with additional classes. Such an overhaul would still prove to be a significant 
endeavor. Therefore, it should be included in any planned upcoming curriculum revisions 
pertaining to the transition to multi-domain operations (MDO). This presents a prime 
opportunity to align any potential upcoming curriculum review with MDO 2028 
emphasizing operations in the information environment. 
An investment in IO education for junior to mid-level leaders in the U.S. Army 
would pay multiple dividends at the tactical level. Those leaders would be in a much better 
position to empower their IO planners and utilize IO resources and capabilities in tactical 
maneuver operations. This improvement would ensure that resources are not wasted at the 
level of implementation as the U.S. Army continues to build its IO force, field new 
information-related capabilities, and organize into new expeditionary formations in support 
of tactical units. Eventually, the U.S. Army could finally achieve the cultural change 
required to elevate IO to a level commensurate with the current reality in which the 
military’s actions in and through the information environment can mean the difference 
between success and failure.  
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D. MILITARY DECEPTION AS AN IO CORE COMPETENCY 
The strategy of the United States will require more than a reliance on its sheer 
military prowess and capabilities to remain competitive and win in future conflict, 
operations, and competition. Great power competition and an increase in states employing 
political warfare and subversive acts to undermine the United States reintroduces a form 
of war that it has not recently focused on. The United States military must tune its forces 
to more adeptly analyze and create effects in the information environment in an effort to 
operate more effectively in the years to come. Although today’s information environment 
is more congested and complicated than during historic wars, the principles of information 
operations, information warfare, and deception remain largely the same. New technologies 
present both a liability and an opportunity for military IO and deception practitioners. As 
Jennifer McArdle recommends in her War on the Rocks article, great power competition 
requires that the United States reexamine the lessons learned from the deception 
practitioners of its past and apply those lessons towards contemporary problem sets.75 
Military deception is a core competency of military information operations practitioners 
and will be a critically enhancing capability in future campaigns and operations. 
Current doctrine of the United States prescribes that military deception is designed 
to cause an adversary decision maker to take an action or inaction that will support the 
friendly force accomplishing its mission. This is an enabling capability that can 
misrepresent the “capabilities, activities, limitations, and intentions” of military 
operations.76 When executed successfully, military deception can help the force achieve 
an advantage during operations at a designated point in time. As Walter Jajko describes, 
military deception is also an effective tool for causing an adversary’s operational advantage 
to be irrelevant.77 In situations where the adversary possesses a distinct advantage, military 
deception can create conditions that cause this advantage to be immaterial during 
operations.  
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In times where the United States cannot apply the full force of its military, or 
political considerations limit the application of kinetic weapons, military deception can be 
an effective complementary effort towards achieving U.S. objectives. Although, as 
McArdle points out, military deception must be seamlessly integrated with operations.78 
For this capability to be effective, it must create unique conditions favorable for friendly 
forces and not necessarily be the operation itself. Great power competition and gray zone 
conflict will present situations where the United States is unable to bring the full force of 
its military to bear. It will require finesse and an understanding of the decision-making 
process of the adversary in order to create conditions and effects that support achieving the 
friendly force objectives.  
The deception operation must not threaten or pose undue risk to the campaign or 
operation. Jajko recommends that “the planning, and practice of deception ought to be 
systematically integrated into military strategy.”79 For this to be feasible, it is imperative 
that military leaders, planners, and units are conceptually aware of deception and both 
trained and educated to understand how to integrate deception into operations. Without this 
prerequisite, like many other enabling functions, deception operations are likely to be 
bolted onto operations in a check the box manner. To demonstrate the current lack of 
integration of deception into operations, Jajko points out that as a contrast to the thinking 
of both China and Russia where deception operations “create an end in themselves,” many 
in the United States military view deception as a “means to an end”.80  
For deception to become mainstream in United States’ military planning, it is 
critical that our leaders and planners are suitably trained and educated in its capabilities 
and benefits. They must also be introduced to the fundamentals and basics of deception, 
much like infantry officers are aware of the core concepts of logistics and armor officers 
understand the idea of combat aviation. Advocates of military deception, information 
operations, and information warfare should lobby for an increased presence of deception 
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in our professional military education courses and institutions. If only a few individuals are 
ever presented with deception operations conceptually, then deception will never become 
a commonplace activity. This is not to say that all members of the Army must become 
deception planners, or that deception is required in all situations. However, our leaders and 
planners must be well versed enough to identify situations that the force may benefit from 
integrating deception into their plans.  
Military leaders must also be cautious of the additional duty solution. Just because 
a planner attends a two-week familiarization course on logistics, does not mean they are 
qualified to become the logistics planner for a geographic combatant command. Much like 
logistics, deception planners require training, education, and experience to become 
proficient at their craft. To this end, current deception practitioners and information 
operations officers must make the effort to hone their proficiency and expertise. They 
should not sit idly by as campaigns and operations are planned waiting for the opportunity 
to present itself to become a part of the effort. They must take the proactive steps to ensure 
that deception is seamlessly integrated into operational planning from the onset.  
Information operations and military deception are interconnected functions, both 
integrating means to affect the decision-making process of the enemy and to create unique 
advantages for the friendly force. U.S. military information operations planners are 
uniquely trained and educated in understanding the information environment as well as 
analyzing and affecting the decision-making process of the adversary. Each IO planner 
must seek opportunities to become better trained in military deception and strive for its 
integration into operations. Without effective and capable deception or IO planners, these 
functions will receive suboptimal to marginal attention during the planning process and in 
execution.  
A principle tenant of U.S. military information operations is to protect the decision-
making process of the force.81 Whether or not the United States invests in the capability, 
capacity, and expertise to integrate deception operations, its adversaries are doing so. 
Michael Kofman presents his views on Russian hybrid warfare and deception in his War 
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on the Rocks article. Here, he discusses Russian integration of political warfare, deception, 
and propaganda in pursuit of its political objectives.82 Russia, and other adversaries of the 
United States, will not pull punches in their efforts to disrupt the decision-making process 
of U.S. military leaders. In their 1995 article, Tactical Deception in Air-Land Warfare, 
Fowler and Nesbit warn that “the military group that is not devoting appropriate efforts to 
include tactics, R&D and plotting and scheming in general for deception is almost certain 
to be vulnerable to being deceived itself.”83 For the United States military to be prepared 
to identify, understand, and counter the deception efforts of its adversaries, it must invest 
in its deception and information operations practitioners. Those planners that understand 
deception are more likely to identify when they are being deceived. With an understanding 
of the information environment, deception, and the adversary, today’s information 
operations and deception planners are poised to identify and counter deceptive efforts of 
U.S. adversaries. The institutions responsible for these individuals must invest in the 
counter-deception capability of its planners as well as that of the military on the whole.  
Deception in warfare and in pursuit of a nation state’s political objectives will 
continue. The United States military must be prepared to integrate deception into plans and 
operations to remain competitive in great power rivalry and in non-permissive 
environments as well as to prepare for future wars. To do this, the U.S. military must invest 
in its deception and information operations practitioners and systems. Its planners must be 
suitably trained and educated to both plan these operations as well as identify and counter 
the deception efforts of its adversaries. Also, the military must raise its collective 
knowledge of deception and be prepared to identify opportunities for its integration.  
In situations where the United States Army cannot apply its full force, information 
operations and military deception are an effective warfighting function that can support in 
achieving its objectives. When the United States Army faces an adversary that is at a near 
parity technologically and militarily, information operations and military deception may 
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provide just enough advantage to achieve and maintain the competitive edge that it is 
accustomed to. Before that can occur, the Army must educate its force, train, practice, and 
become adept at integrating information operations in a controlled training environment. 
These efforts will enable a smoother transition from the training centers to integrating IO 
and maneuver operations in real-world conflict. Additionally, these activities will build a 
stronger identity and unity of purpose among the network of information operations 
personnel in the Department of Defense. Continued education, training, and integration of 
information operations and military deception will help to build a stronger identity within 
the community and a more consolidated front within the Army and the military.  
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V. SNA AND SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY IN THE ARMY IO 
PROFESSION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The United States Army recognizes the increasing importance of the information 
environment in modern conflict. As the U.S. Army postures for multi-domain operations 
(MDO), it is exploring how to best converge cross-domain capabilities, including information 
related capabilities (IRCs), to maximize effects against our adversaries.84 To achieve 
convergence of IRCs, the U.S. Army needs to invest in its community of FA30s. The FA30’s 
purpose is to synchronize and coordinate IRCs in pursuit of the commander’s objectives in 
the information environment,85 a role which will certainly become more crucial as the U.S. 
Army adopts MDO. In this chapter, we will examine how the U.S. Army can apply 
contemporary theories of social network analysis, social identity, and trust to improve the 
FA30 community’s cohesion and organizational influence at a relatively low cost, thereby 
enabling the community to meet the increasingly challenging task of waging information 
warfare in future conflict. This chapter is divided into two sections: The first section uses 
social network analysis (SNA) concepts to describe the essential role that FA30s perform as 
brokers within the information warfare community. The second section recommends that 
building a strong social identity, potentially by elevating the FA30 to the status of a basic 
branch, can improve trust, influence, and unity of effort within the profession. 
B. THE FA30 COMMUNITY AND SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 
This section of the analysis assesses the FA30 career field and its placement and role 
in the network of the information warfare community and the U.S. Army. The unique position 
of the FA30s in their organizations, as well as the relationships they garner, make them 
brokers between disparate parts of the network, allowing for enhanced cooperation and wider 
diffusion of information. The bridges that FA30s form allow agencies to cooperate in pursuit 
of common objectives more efficiently and with mutually supported operations. As 
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integrators and synchronizers of IRCs, one of the greatest assets of the FA30 is their social 
capital and their ability to serve as an interlocutor between otherwise disconnected 
organizations. Finally, the network of communication between FA30s is unique and stronger 
because of the strength of weak ties. These characteristics of FA30s demonstrate their 
importance in the network and their ability to integrate information operations within the U.S. 
Army as well as broader U.S. government informational efforts. 
1. Brokers, Cutpoints, and Bridges 
As the synchronizers and coordinators of information related capabilities, the purpose 
of the FA30 is to serve as brokers within the Army’s network to facilitate and coordinate 
operations in the information environment between the information warfare community and 
their unit. Most organizations are billeted between one and a handful of Information 
Operations Officers, with anything more being an exception. It is these individuals’ 
responsibility to coordinate internally and externally to the organization to develop and 
execute operations. Because of their unique external contacts, FA30s are cutpoints in the 
Army’s network. Most FA30s are uniquely trained in the integration of IRCs including 
military deception, operations security, electronic warfare, special technical operations, and 
cyberspace operations. Through their training, various assignments, and cultivated 
relationships, FA30s eventually develop contacts within various other organizations. Some of 
these organizations are very niche in capability while others are broader in their mission sets. 
The variety of relationships that the FA30 develops is unique to the FA30 community. Few 
other career fields develop the types of relationships with similar signatures that FA30s do 
during their career. These unique relationships enable what Robert Putnam would describe as 
a benefit-rich network because it has “contacts established in the places where useful bits of 
information are likely to air.”86  
When assigned to an organization, FA30s bring their understanding of the IRC 
community, experience, and relationships. Because of these unique and nonredundant 
relationships, FA30s are a cutpoint in the network between their unit and the information 
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warfare community. As cutpoints and brokers in this network, their removal would disconnect 
the network as they serve as a connection between the unit they are assigned and other 
organizations. In pursuit of operations of the unit to which they are assigned, FA30s must 
often coordinate for support from external agencies. It is then that FA30s leverage their 
expertise in understanding what unique organizations in the U.S. government are best suited 
to support the unit. In most cases, the FA30 is the only member of the organic unit that has 
these relationships. As such, these ties to external agencies are non-redundant and form 
structural links with the adjoining networks.87 Without the FA30 in the network, both the unit 
to which they would be assigned and potentially affected external agencies would struggle to 
make the appropriate connections in the network to develop effective and well-coordinated 
operations in the information environment. 
2. Social Capital 
In part because of the unique position of the FA30 in the network, they must rely 
heavily on their social capital. Oftentimes, units have very few organic IRCs at their disposal, 
and IO officers must exercise their social capital to be effective. In The Social Structure of 
Competition, Ronald Burt discusses three kinds of capital present in competitive arenas: 
financial, human, and social.88 The FA30’s relationships with other actors in the network are 
their social capital. Through their previously encountered associates, friends, and former 
colleagues, the FA30 has the opportunity to use their capital to develop concepts for 
operations in the IE. With stronger social capital, the FA30 has more opportunity to 
demonstrate effectiveness internally and externally to their organization or network. Robert 
Putnam, in Tuning In, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America, 
explores social capital in the United States. Here, he describes social capital as an attribute 
that allows individuals to increase their effectiveness in pursuit of common goals.89 
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Well-coordinated and mutually supporting operations in the information environment 
are developed through the communication between different actors in the information warfare 
community and related interagency organizations. The FA30 must understand what 
organizations are best suited and poised to provide support to their unit during operations, and 
likewise, how their unit will affect the operations of the external organizations and broader 
U.S. government efforts. When support is requested from an external organization, the FA30 
leverages their social capital to develop more efficient operations. In the information 
environment, coordinated and mutually supporting operations are to the benefit of both 
organizations. Because of social capital, where both actors have something to gain and lose, 
the involved organizations are able to increase their effectiveness in pursuit of shared 
objectives.  
Bridging social capital is important because it helps groups break out of their insular 
echo chambers. Since FA30s do not belong to any specific IRC, they provide the bridging 
social capital needed for a unit to break down stovepipes and operate holistically in the 
information environment. Many members of the information warfare community are 
specialists in certain areas. PSYOP Soldiers excel at coordinating psychological operations 
while electronic warfare Soldiers excel at electronic warfare. The same holds true for the rest 
of the IW community. However, FA30s do not belong to any specific capability or function, 
and are therefore uniquely poised to assess the information environment more holistically than 
their counterparts. From this perspective, FA30s can support the integration and coordination 
of disparate information related capabilities in pursuit of achieving unique conditions and 
objectives for the commander. Information operations officers are well poised to identify key 
actors during any given operation in the information environment and integrate their specific 
functions to achieve unique and otherwise unidentified conditions. As Robert Putnam 
describes, this bridging function can provide “enhanced cooperation [that] is likely to serve 
broader interests and to be widely welcomed.”90 The unique position, experience, and 
relationships of the FA30, brought by their social capital, serve as a bridge that connects the 
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otherwise disconnected parts of the information warfare community. This enables the 
enhanced cooperation towards shared goals that Putnam describes.  
FA30s also have the potential to serve as brokers between the Army and the Joint 
Force, as well as interagency partners that conduct operations in the information environment. 
The Department of State’s Global Engagement Center (GEC) is tasked to “direct, lead, 
synchronize, integrate, and coordinate efforts of the Federal Government to recognize, 
understand, expose, and counter foreign state and non-state propaganda and disinformation 
efforts.”91 An FA30 assigned to the GEC is well poised to provide their perspective on the 
information environment as a broker with bridging social capital. They can also leverage their 
experience working in the field to enhance both the GEC’s operations and those of the U.S. 
Army, thus truly serving as a bridge to coordinate actions between the two organizations. In 
the information environment, it is critical to avoid conflicting messages. Not doing so can 
cause significant detriment to the effort. As a broker between the GEC and the Army, this 
FA30 has a vantage point to ensure that GEC operations do not conflict with the Army’s, and 
likewise, that the Army does not detract from GEC operations. This individual can likely 
synchronize and coordinate operations to achieve mutually supporting and unique conditions 
for both networks and further support U.S. government efforts in the information 
environment.  
3. Strength of Weak Ties 
In The Strength of Weak Ties, Granovetter discusses how weak ties between disparate 
parts of a system can enable a wider diffusion of information across the system.92 He argues 
that “large-scale patterns” develop through “small-scale interactions.”93 To understand and 
analyze these small-scale interactions and their influence in diffusion and networks, he applies 
personal ties and their strength between the individuals. In this study, Granovetter uses the 
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time developing the tie, intensity, and reciprocity in the bond, among other characteristics, to 
determine the strength of the tie.94 He concludes that the diffusion of information is more 
likely to “traverse greater social distance (i.e., path length), when passed through weak ties 
rather than strong.”95 Accordingly, he argues that the removal of a weak tie, which 
subsequently forms a local bridge, can have greater damage to a network than the removal of 
a strong tie.96 
This study by Granovetter presents evidence for the strength of the FA30 network in 
the information warfare community, the U.S. Army, and the broader U.S. government efforts 
in the information environment. Weak ties between FA30s develop bridges to parts of the 
system that are otherwise disconnected. These weak ties are created through previously 
associated contacts, colleagues met during professional education, or many other instances 
where a bond is formed. Because of the very low density of FA30s in the Army, they must 
rely on their weak ties to other parts of the system to maximize cross-communication and 
information diffusion across the system. As FA30s increase the amount of bonds they have 
with other FA30s, through events like professional education, deployments, or mutually 
shared assignments, the potential for future bridges in the network grows. As these individuals 
depart and are reassigned to disparate parts of the network, the number of weak ties connecting 
otherwise disconnected parts of the system grows. These ties serve as bridges between the 
otherwise disconnected system and enable a wider diffusion of information across U.S. 
government efforts in the information environment.  
C. SOCIAL IDENTITY IN THE FA30 COMMUNITY 
The following section first outlines the positive impacts of social identity on 
organizations, specifically groups of occupational specialties and career fields within the U.S. 
Army. Second, this section describes the challenges that the FA30 community faces with 
developing a shared social identity, partly due to a lack of a consistent IO concept and formal 
organizational symbols, which can potentially undermine the FA30’s brokerage and 
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influence. The hypothesis is that a unified and distinct group identity amongst the U.S. Army’s 
information warfare community would improve the trust, cohesion, and unity of effort 
between the FA30 community and the IRCs with whom they coordinate. 
1. What is Social Identity and What are the Benefits? 
Social identity is an aspect of human psychology whose application transcends 
numerous fields of study. Two of the pioneers of social identity research were social scientist 
Henri Tajfel and his cohort John Turner, who described social identity as “those aspects of an 
individual’s self-image that derive from the social categories to which he perceives himself 
as belonging.”97 In other words, an individual’s social identity is the degree to which they 
associate their own identity to that of the group, or groups, in which they belong. Thus, social 
identity theory is the study of how social identity impacts human relations within and between 
those groups. 
Social psychologists use the theory to examine and understand human behavior as it 
relates to ingroup versus outgroup dynamics. Social identity researchers often focus on 
recognizing and mitigating the negative ramifications of social identity, which can lead to 
intergroup violence, prejudice, xenophobia, ethnocentrism, and racism. For example, social 
psychologists have previously demonstrated how members of one’s social group, or 
“ingroup,” can develop hostilities towards a rival group, or “outgroup,” and vice versa. The 
Robber’s Cave experiment demonstrated that social identity could facilitate hostile intergroup 
interactions under certain circumstances, by placing young boys into two competing groups 
(the “Eagles” and the “Rattlers”) who began to exhibit increasingly antagonistic behavior 
towards one another once their social identity became salient.98 Furthermore, in her book 
Uncivil Agreement: How Politics Became Our Identity, author Lilliana Mason describes how 
identity-based partisan politics are increasingly dividing Americans and reducing 
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compromise, thereby impeding the American political system’s ability to function properly.99 
These are just two examples of some harmful consequences of social identity.  
However, social identity research also suggests that a well-established group identity 
can positively impact an organization’s cohesion and effectiveness. Social identity theorists 
and researchers widely concur that positive group identity can improve cooperation, levels of 
effort and engagement, group decision-making, morale and motivation, information sharing 
and coordination, and the performance of tasks.100 Simply put, members of an organization 
are more likely to perform their duties effectively and enthusiastically when they identify with 
the organization. This is especially true in the U.S. Army, where leaders commonly emphasize 
unit teamwork, cohesion, and morale to improve combat effectiveness and readiness. For this 
reason, military culture is infused with traditions and customs intended to maximize cohesion 
and group identity. Furthermore, members of the U.S. Army derive their social identity not 
only from their organizational unit, but also from their assigned duty position or military 
occupational specialty (MOS). The U.S. Army consists of 45 occupational branches and 
functional areas, each one with a unique identity of its own.101 Upon qualification of their 
assigned tradecraft, group members assume their occupation’s identity as part of their own, 
including its history, traditions, reputation, and credibility.  
Furthermore, a group’s identity facilitates trust-building, both within and outside of 
the organization. Granovetter describes five sources of trust in his book Society and Economy: 
Framework and Principles. Among these sources is trust based on memberships in groups 
and networks, which relates to the social identity and reputation of a group.102 By cultivating 
a shared social identity amongst its group members, an organization builds both trust and 
influence. Indeed, an organization with a well-established identity is better positioned to 
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influence than an organization that lacks a shared purpose and identity. To illustrate, in their 
research article for Academy of Management Review titled “Social Identity Theory and the 
Organization,” authors Blake Ashforth and Fred Mael examined the existing body of 
theoretical and empirical work on social identity and influence, concluding:  
[A] positive and distinctive organizational identity attracts the recognition, 
support, and loyalty of not only organizational members but other key 
constituents (e.g., shareholders, customers, job seekers), and it is this search 
for a distinctive identity that induces organizations to focus so intensely on 
advertising, names and logos, jargon, leaders and mascots, and so forth.103  
In other words, organizations with reputable, trusted, and distinct identities are better 
able to wield external influence. 
2. Social Identity in U.S. Army Information Operations 
The importance of an organization’s social identity carries enormous implications for 
the FA30 community’s ability to act as brokers and wield social capital in the information 
warfare community. As described earlier, most FA30s serve as either the sole IO officer or as 
members of a small section on a division or higher staff. Their specialized duty places FA30s 
in a unique position to interface directly with unit leadership, including the operations officer 
and even the commander. Because mission success could very well depend on the unit’s 
ability to conduct operations in the information environment, leadership places enormous trust 
in FA30s. Furthermore, FA30s operate in a coordinating capacity with neither the authority 
nor the mandate to direct the actions of IRCs on the battlefield. Thus, FA30s must rely on 
their influence and relationships to synchronize nested effects within the information 
environment in support of the commander’s objectives. To accomplish all of this, FA30s must 
have a strong, reputable, and consistent group identity which creates trust and influence with 
their peers and leadership. Unfortunately, this is not the current reality facing the FA30 
community. 
Instead, the FA30 community has struggled to establish a coherent social identity. 
This is not because of any failure on the part of the community’s leadership or members. 
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Rather, the FA30 community faces unique challenges in creating a social identity, including 
the rapidly evolving nature of IO in military doctrine. In “Chapter 3 - IO in Design,” we 
discussed some of the issues created by the ever-changing terminology and definitions 
regarding IO in U.S. Army doctrine. Additionally, In COL Christopher Lowe’s monograph 
titled “From ‘Battle’ to ‘Battle of Ideas:’ The Meaning and Misunderstanding of Information 
Operations,” the author chronicles the history of the U.S. military’s attempts to define its 
operations in the information environment through such concepts as Command Control 
Communication Countermeasures (C3CM) and Command and Control Warfare (C2W) 
before designating the function as Information Operations in 1996.104 Since then, the Army 
briefly replaced IO with Inform and Influence Activities (IIA) in the late 2010s before 
transitioning back to Information Operations in the latest edition of FM 3-13.105 Today, the 
terms information dominance and information warfare have informally entered the lexicon, 
with neither clearly defined in doctrine, while the Joint Force appears ready to adopt the term 
Operations in the Information Environment (OIE) as part of the MDO concept.106 With yet 
another potential name change on the horizon, it is only a matter of time before the term IO 
itself becomes outdated.  
Admittedly, these frequent changes have been a necessary byproduct of “the rapidly 
changing nature of information, its flow, processing, dissemination, impact and […] its 
military employment” as well as lessons learned from employing information in the persistent 
conflicts of the post-9/11 era.107 Regardless, the frequent changes have created inconsistency 
and ambiguity about the fundamental purpose on which the FA30 profession is built, thereby 
contributing to its underdeveloped and muddled social identity. As a result, it is increasingly 
difficult for even the most articulate FA30s to explain their purpose clearly and concisely to 
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their leaders and peers. This partially contributes to the widespread marginalization of the 
profession throughout the U.S. Army. 
Undoubtedly, the lack of a clear and consistent organizational purpose can have severe 
ramifications both inside and outside of the organization. Ashforth and Mael describe the 
consensus amongst the existing body of work on social identity theory:  
An organization has an identity to the extent there is a shared understanding 
of the central, distinctive, and enduring character or essence of the 
organization among its members. This identity may be reflected in shared 
values and beliefs, a mission, the structure and processes, organizational 
climate, and so on. The more salient, stable, and internally consistent the 
character of an organization […] the greater this internalization.108  
In contrast, the U.S. military’s evolving approach to IO, far from creating a shared 
understanding, has instead generated ongoing confusion and ambiguity towards the FA30 
community’s purpose and identity. Without a clear purpose and identity amongst its 
information professionals, the U.S. Army consistently underperforms in the information 
environment. As discussed in the previous chapter, reflected in after-action reports from U.S. 
military combat training centers (CTCs), which indicate widespread misunderstandings and 
systemic illiteracy towards IO.109 Truly, the issue extends beyond the social identity of the 
FA30 community and is creating operational problems for the U.S. Army. 
Confusion surrounding IO terminology and definitions is not the only institutional 
hurdle that the FA30 community faces in pursuit of a group identity. Additionally, the FA30 
community’s small size and relative obscurity within the Army contributes to its lack of social 
identity. The active duty FA30 community consists of less than 300 commissioned officers, 
with no enlisted or warrant officer representation.110 With an active duty Army of 
approximately 475,000, this means that the FA30 community amounts to approximately .06% 
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of the total active duty force.111 Furthermore, the small FA30 community is dispersed across 
the U.S. Army in individual nodes or small clusters, with the notable exception being 1st 
Information Operations Command, the only active duty IO unit in the Army.112 The wide 
distribution of FA30s is a necessary outcome of their specialized position on unit staffs, but 
as a result, the FA30 network is far less dense and cohesive than most other occupational 
specialties in the U.S. Army. As mentioned in the previous section of this chapter, this only 
increases the importance of the relationships and bonds that FA30s build with each other. 
3. Social Identity and Organizational Symbolism  
Organizational symbolism is an element of social identity that represents a group’s 
shared stories, narratives, ceremonies, and logos which characterize “the underlying character, 
ideology, or value system of an organization.”113 The impact of symbolism on a group’s 
identity, cohesion, and morale cannot be understated. In fact, “through the manipulation of 
symbols such as traditions, myths, metaphors, rituals, sagas, heroes, and physical setting, 
management can make the individual’s membership salient and can provide compelling 
images of what the group or organization represents.”114 In other words, organizational 
symbols, narratives, and lineage create both an outward representation of the profession’s 
social identity and a tool to promote internal unity of effort amongst the members of the 
community.  
In the U.S. military, organizational symbolism manifests itself in the form of heraldry. 
The U.S. Army Institute of Heraldry (TIOH) describes the purpose of heraldry as “a 
communication system that uses colors and symbols for the purpose of personal or 
organizational identification,” and traces its origins back to the practical requirement of 
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needing to identify heavily armored soldiers on the 11th and 12th-century battlefields.115 To 
identify unit capabilities, Army basic branches each carry their own unique insignia and colors 
as well as mottos, mascots, and songs that celebrate the profession’s lineage and history. Some 
branches even carry additional items of adornment, such as the blue cord worn by the infantry 
branch,116 which is another outward expression of the group’s identity. Additionally, most 
branches have adopted one or more branch-specific awards to recognize outstanding 
achievements within the profession, such as the Saint Barbara Award for the Field Artillery 
and Air Defense Artillery branches.117 These symbols help facilitate a strong social identity 
within the organization. 
Unfortunately, the FA30 community has limited options when it comes to 
organizational symbols, due in part to its status as a functional area as opposed to a basic 
branch. A functional area is “a grouping of officers by technical specialty or skills other than 
an arm, Service, or branch that usually requires unique education, training, and 
experience.”118 Functional areas are distinguishable from basic branches in that they do not 
carry their own insignia, colors, or other uniquely identifying symbols, and have little to no 
heraldry associated with them. Once an individual applies and becomes designated into a 
functional area, they remain administratively associated with their basic branch, including its 
heraldry. Consequently, professionals within U.S. Army functional areas retain the insignia, 
colors, symbolism, and overall identity of their originating branch. This leaves the FA30 
community with little to no outward symbolic representation of its own unique organizational 
identity. This point should not be misconstrued. The Army FA30 community includes 
professionals from 19 different basic branches across four competitive categories,119 and its 
diversity of occupational backgrounds and breadth of experience constitutes one of its greatest 
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strengths. The operational, technical, and leadership backgrounds of each member is an 
irreplaceable resource to the community. However, while all members of the FA30 
community can and should take pride in their originating branch, the FA30 community would 
nevertheless benefit from adopting its own organizational symbols and social identity. 
4. Organizational Symbolism in Army Information Operations 
Although options are limited, there are existing symbols that the FA30 community 
that the profession could adopt to represent the entire organization. The U.S. Army 
Information Operations Proponent (USAIOP) is the primary Army organization charged with 
all IO-related doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel, facilities, and 
policy (DOTMLPF-P) requirements.120 The USAIOP manages the U.S. Army Information 
Operations Qualification Course (IOQC), and thus is credited with training, educating, and 
certifying every MOS-qualified FA30 in the U.S. Army. Clearly, the symbol of the USAIOP, 
as depicted in Figure 2, is an image that every IO profession in the U.S. Army can incorporate 
into their own social identity. 
 
Figure 2. USAIOP symbol.121 
Notably, the symbolism behind this prominent symbol was previously undocumented, 
or at least was inaccessible to the wider IO profession as a whole, prior to the research 
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associated with this thesis. During the course of our research on organizational symbolism in 
the IO profession, we interviewed retired Lieutenant Colonel Mark Garrett, an FA30 and one 
of the individuals who participated in the creation of the symbol. From this, the researchers 
generated a proposal to the U.S. Army Institute of Heraldry, which is pending final approval 
as of publication of this thesis. 
The USAIOP symbol prominently features a sword and lightning bolt combination, 
which is a recurring image in the IO profession. The 1st IO Command unit insignia, as 
depicted in Figure 3, also prominently features this motif. 1st IO Command officially adopted 
this logo on May 21, 2004, and the symbolism is described as follows: “The lightning flash 
denotes speed and the Command’s ability to strike wherever and whenever needed. The sword 
denotes the unit’s responsibility and ability to defend and protect all forces.”122 
 
Figure 3. 1st Information Operations Command shoulder sleeve insignia.123 
Of course, numerous Army units and occupational specialties claim variations of 
sword and lightning bolt as their symbol, including Army Special Forces where those 
components are notably featured on their shoulder sleeve insignia.124 However, the 1st IO 
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Command’s unique version of this symbol, with its single lightning bolt canted roughly 45 
degrees, also features in the insignia of many IO units in the National Guard and Reserve. 
Figure 4 depicts a selection of these IO units which also have adopted a variation of 
insignia. 
Figure 4. Sword and lightning bolt imagery in Army IO unit symbolism125 
In 2004, 11 years after 1st IO command adopted its unit insignia, the U.S. Army 
adopted a similar sword and lightning bolt image as the branch insignia for the new Cyber 
Corps basic branch, as depicted in Figure 5.126 Considering the proliferation of the image 
throughout Army IO culture, it is reasonable to propose that the crossed sword and lightning 
bolts could expand to represent the identity of the entire information warfare community, 
including FA30s.  
125 Adapted from “Information Operations,” Department of the Army, accessed June 6, 2020. 
https://tioh.army.mil/Catalog/HeraldryList.aspx?CategoryId=371&grp=2&menu=Uniformed%20Services. 




Figure 5. Army Cyber Corps branch insignia127 
5. Mercury and Hermes Symbolism in the Army IO Profession
Another prominent symbol that already exists in Army IO culture is the Roman 
messenger god Mercury and its synonymous Greek counterpart Hermes. As depicted in 
Figure 6, the name Mercury is invoked in the unit crests of both the 56th IO Group and 
156th IO Battalion, with the phrase “Defend/Protect Mercury” which signifies the unit’s 
mission to protect information, according to the U.S. Army Institute of Heraldry.128 
Among mythological figures, Mercury seems to be a reasonable choice to represent the 
modern IO profession, with his speed and duty to carry information a solid analogy for the 
fast paced, internet-enabled information environment of modern times.  
Additionally, the Information Professionals Association (IPA), a collaborative 
civilian and military professional organization focused on cognitive and information 
security-related issues, recently partnered with 1st IO Command to develop the Order of 
Hermes honorary award for information professionals.129 The Order of Hermes was first 
awarded in 2018 as a joint venture between the IPA and 1st IO Command to “recognize 
individuals for exceptional service and contributions in the field of cognitive security and 
information operations.”130 Like Mercury in the aforementioned examples, Hermes 
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represents the speed of information, as well as the messenger god’s inclination towards 
using disguises, deception, and stratagem as portrayed in Homer’s The Iliad.131 This suits 
the Information Operations profession well, given their core capability of military 
deception planning. 
Figure 6. Selection of Army IO imagery depicting Mercury and Hermes.132 
Clearly, either the Roman or Greek incarnation of the messenger god is already a 
suitable candidate for a unifying symbol of the information warfare community. 
D. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The U.S. Army could enhance the social identity of its FA30 community by
elevating the community to the status of a basic branch, either on its owned or combined 
with other IRCs within the information warfare community to promote unity of effort. 
Elevating the FA30 community to the status of a basic branch would symbolically and 
appropriately raise Army IO to meet the challenges of future conflict. Furthermore, 
reinventing the FA30 community as a basic branch would enable it to formally adopt its 
own organizational symbols, colors, and other items of heraldry reserved for U.S. Army 
basic branches, thus facilitating the IO officer profession to further define its own identity 
and improve its social capital within the information warfare community. This concept 
would reflect the “Information Dominance” competitive category at the Army Human 
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https://tioh.army.mil/Catalog/HeraldryList.aspx?CategoryId=371&grp=2&menu=Uniformed%20Services. 
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Resources Command (HRC), allowing IO and CEMA to remain as unique coded 
specialties under a single MOS area of concentration. This would both promote a more 
unified social identity between FA30s and the Cyberspace Corps, as well as better organize 
our IRC career fields per MDO doctrine’s concept of convergence of effects.  
Whether the FA30 profession is elevated as a basic branch on its own, or 
consolidated with other information-related professions, it would require a branch insignia 
symbol as an outward representation of the organization. Previously in this chapter, the 
researchers identified the crossed sword and lightning flash motif as a potential unifying 
symbol of the IO profession. Figure 7 depicts a stylized version of this insignia which 
could potentially serve as a branch insignia.  
Figure 7. Proposed IO branch insignia. 
Admittedly, this recommendation itself is neither novel nor unique. Military 
professionals recommended and advocated for the consolidation of IRC career fields into 
an “Information Warfare” branch since at least 2005.133 However, since then, entities 
within the U.S. Army’s information warfare community have only become more disparate. 
This research paper adds to the growing call for unity of effort within the information 
warfare community by demonstrating its benefits through the lens of social network 
analysis and social identity theory.  
133 George Brown, “Do We Need FA30? Creating an Information Warfare Branch,” Military Review 
(January-February 2005), 39-43, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=451582. 
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E. WAY AHEAD 
As the U.S. Army transitions to multi-domain operations, it will seek to impose 
“multiple and compounding”134 problems for the adversary on land, sea, air, space, 
cyberspace, and through the information environment. Operations in the information 
environment will be synchronized with more traditional forms of maneuver warfare to seek 
positions of advantage over our enemies. It is through the information warfare community 
that these operations will be developed, synchronized, coordinated, and executed in support 
of the Army and joint force operations. The U.S. Army’s FA30 is uniquely trained, 
educated, and well-poised in the network to provide these functions for the U.S. Army in 
contemporary and future conflict in multi-domain operations. To maximize their role in the 
network, the strength of the FA30 must rely on more than just the capabilities and 
reputation of the individual. They must derive from the reputation and social identity of 
the greater Information Operations community to form a stronger collective presence in 
the Army and joint force. The FA30 career field must be elevated to a level appropriately 
commensurate with the recognition of the expanded role of the information environment 
in multi-domain operations. Through improved organizational cohesion and greater trust 
within and for the FA30 community, FA30s will be better able to perform their role as 
synchronizers and coordinators of operations in the information environment. 
  
 
134 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028, 
iii. 
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VI. CONCLUSION  
Adversaries of the United States will continue to integrate information operations, 
information warfare, deception, and cyberspace operations more effectively during conflict 
and warfare. To maintain the competitive advantage that it is accustomed to, the U.S. Army 
must become more proficient and ready to detect, defend against, and defeat these threats. 
Part of this will require the Army to adapt so the force can more wholly and deliberately 
make these functions and capabilities a more common facet of its operations. In support of 
these efforts and the doctrinal shift to multi-domain operations, the Army is realizing how 
it can “pose multiple and compounding dilemmas on the adversary.”135 In pursuit of these 
efforts, the Army must recognize and overcome obstacles and challenges to rectify the 
disparity between information operations in design and in practice.  
Partly because the contemporary information environment changes so quickly, IO 
is one of the most significant topics of discussion amongst scholars, practitioners, and 
warfighters. The field of information operations resides on a very broad spectrum of related 
activities and there are often quite distinct differences between how many interpret and 
understand the role of IO.136 Much of the misinterpretation and misunderstanding is 
largely self-imposed by numerous changes in the doctrine and even changing the name of 
the function itself. What began as a concept of Command Control Communication 
Countermeasures and Command and Control Warfare, became Information Operations in 
1996, spent a brief time as Inform and Influence Activities, only to return to Information 
Operations again in 2016.137 With each of these changes in the field, aspects of the function 
changed as well, conflating both the purpose and perceptions of IO. On this journey of self-
realization, soldiers and leaders form a variety of misaligned opinions on the meaning and 
function of IO. Overtime, the amorphous meaning and doctrine of IO creates an 
 
135 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028, 
iii. 
136 Fecteau, Understanding Information Operations and Information Warfare. 
137 Lowe, "From 'Battle' to 'Battle of Ideas,'” ii.  
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environment where the force as a whole does not have a collective understanding of what 
IO is or how to properly integrate it.  
Further compounding this issue, units in the Army are undertrained and 
undereducated in IO and it is under-represented in tactical units at brigade and below as 
demonstrated during unit rotations at the CTCs.138 Without properly training and 
rehearsing the integration of IO during tactical unit exercises and rehearsals, true 
integration of IO into operations is an untenable objective. Understandably, with IO as a 
mere footnote in Army PME, it is not surprising that the soldiers and leaders in the force 
have only a broad conceptual understanding of how IO can enhance and support operations.  
Doctrine, education, and training only go so far explaining the disparity between 
the design of IO and its application. The FA30 community is at a disadvantage because it 
lacks a coherent social identity. This impacts the community’s overall effectiveness 
because social identity is directly tied to an organization’s cohesion, morale, information 
sharing, coordination, and overall effectiveness.139 The FA30 identity crisis is partly due 
to an Army-wide misunderstanding of IO following years of constantly changing IO 
doctrine, terminology, and theories of execution, which hurts the community’s ability to 
internalize a clearly defined organizational purpose. Additionally, as a functional area, the 
FA30 community lacks any insignia, colors, and other uniquely identifying heraldry with 
which to outwardly distinguish itself and build group identity. As a result, the U.S. Army 
lacks an institutional shared understanding of both IO and the purpose of FA30s. The 
impact on the FA30 community’s ability to perform its function is enormous. The absence 
of a cohesive organizational identity negatively impacts FA30’s professional cohesion, 
degrades the FA30’s organizational influence and credibility, and hinders its ability to 
function as coordinators of IRCs. The result is that many FA30s are marginalized, ignored, 
under-utilized, or incorrectly utilized.  
The scope of Army IO is ambiguous and ill-defined. This inhibits both the force’s 
understanding of the field as well as the practitioners’ ability to describe their craft 
 
138 Joint Multinational Readiness Center, “JMRC IO Trends for CGSC,” May 26, 2020. 
139 Ashforth, Harrison, and Corley, “Identification in Organizations,” 336-337. 
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accurately and concisely, let alone fully integrate to the extent required in contemporary 
warfare. A deliberate return to the Joint and Army definition and purpose of IO can help 
rectify this challenge while helping to consolidate a shared identity in the career field. This 
can be furthered by anchoring IO to two clear and definable functions, military deception 
and operations security. As described throughout this study and the definition of IO in FM 
3-13, IO has two clear purposes, to attack the enemy’s decision-making process and protect 
our own.140 The intent of MILDEC to cause an adversary to take either an action or 
inaction favorable to the friendly force is congruent with the first half of the definition of 
IO.141 Similarly, OPSEC closely aligns and supports the second half of the definition of 
IO as this function aims to protect the operations and decision-making of the friendly 
force.142 By taking clear ownership of both MILDEC and OPSEC, IO practitioners will 
have a clear, definable, and quantifiable purpose that will both enable them to more 
efficiently execute their craft as well as help form an identity to rally behind.  
MILDEC will continue becoming more critical in warfare as the U.S. Army 
operates in constrained or contested environments. An IO practitioner that is educated, 
trained, and capable of integrating MILDEC into operations will be a significant 
contribution to any operation or plan in future conflict or competition. As U.S. adversaries 
continue to execute deception operations, a dedicated IO officer who can identify adversary 
deception and plan for counter-deception is critical. Similarly, adversaries will continue to 
seek ways to disrupt the decision-making processes of the friendly force. Through OPSEC, 
where critical indicators of operations are identified and obfuscated as described in JP 
3-13.3, an IO practitioner can support the protection of our own processes. Taking 
ownership of these two functions as a field and anchoring to their purpose supports both a 
shared identity as well as a collective purpose. 
The degree to which the FA30 community can overcome its identity crisis will 
determine how well the U.S. Army can recruit, train, retain, and employ its IO professionals 
 
140 Department of the Army, Information Operations, 1-2. 
141 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Military Deception, I-4.  
142 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Operations Security, JP 3-13.3, (Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2012), II-1. 
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to meet the current and future challenges of information warfare. One crucial component 
of a solution is the standardization of Joint IO definitions, terminology, focus, and scope 
across the entire DOD. The Joint Concept for Operations in the Information Environment 
(JCOIE) is an important step towards standardizing joint IO and building cooperative 
efforts between service branch IO professionals. The JCOIE emphasizes information as a 
critical component of multi-domain operations in current and future warfare. Even more 
important, it calls for a greater shared understanding of IO within the Joint force, including 
“a common lexicon, standardization of processes, and establishment of relationships that 
reduce or eliminate barriers to the integration of physical power and informational 
power.”143 The institutional standardization of IO across the DOD would help each service 
branch build a cohesive organizational identity within its community of IO professionals, 
as well as help create an overall Joint IO community which is currently non-existent.  
For its part, the U.S. Army should consider elevating the FA30 profession to the 
status of a branch. The establishment of an IO branch would symbolically raise the 
importance of the Army IO profession to a level commensurate with the expanded role of 
information in MDO. Additionally, it would also enhance the organizational identity of the 
profession by creating branch insignia and other organizational symbolism with which to 
outwardly express itself. 
Without a doubt, the U.S. Army FA30 performs an essential role in information 
warfare, and the importance of the position will only increase as the information 
environment becomes more central in current and future warfare. The U.S. Army will 
continue to require staff experts focused on the holistic integration of all information-
related effects, and the FA30 will fill that role regardless of whatever form the position 
takes. By standardizing Joint and Army IO doctrine and terminology, as well as 
investigating the possibility of creating an IO branch, the Army can help build the identity 
and capability of its IO community, thus better empowering them to wage information 
warfare in future conflicts. 
 
143 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Concept for Operating in the Information Environment (JCOIE), 
(Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018), ix. 
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